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ADVICE AND CONSENT: INTERNATIONAL
EXECUTIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS
D. CHRISTOPHER OHLY*
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion
of legislative power, but with such authority plus the very
delicate plenary and exclusive power of the President, as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations....
I
-Justice George Sutherland
[lit was understood by all to be the intent of the [Treaty] k
provision to give that power the most ample latitude-to render it competent to all the stipulations which the exigencies
of national affairs might require, competent to the making
of treaties of alliance, treaties of commerce, treaties of peace,
and every other species of convention usual among nations . . .
And it was emphatically for this reason that it
was so carefully guarded; the cooperation of two-thirds of the
Senate, with the President, being required to make any treaty
2
whatever.
-Alexander Hamilton

Executive agreements have increasingly become the mediumof international agreement by the United States with other sovereign powers.' Indeed, such agreements which effectively preclude the advice and consent of the Congress, have almost entirely replaced the treaty as the mechanism of international con* Associate with the firm of Melnicove, Greenberg, Kaufman & Weiner,
Baltimore, Maryland. A.B., Johns Hopkins University; J.D., University of Virginia.
1. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-320 (1936).
2. A. Hamilton, Letters of Camillus, cited in R. BERGER, EXECUTIVWE PRIVILEGE: A CONsTrrUTIONAL MYTH 143-44 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BERGER].
3. See 14 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 210 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WHITEMAN]; J.N. Moore, The Roles of Congress and the President
in Foreign Affairs, 7 INT'L LAWYER 740 (1973) [hereinafter cited as J.N.
Moore].
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cord in many substantive areas, and have become an "indispensible tool of foreign relations."4 Even ardent advocates of
the assertion of congressional authority in the international agreement-making process have suggested that, "no one has doubted
that the President has the power to make some 'sole' executive
agreements . . ."' which may prevail "even in the face of earlier
congressional legislation." 6 Yet the influence of Congress, and
particularly the Senate, in the international agreement-making
process continues to decline, almost in direct proportion to the
expansion of presidential power. This amplification of presidential power has occurred through the process of "usage,"'
which seemingly bypasses explicit constitutional provisions.'
No serious effort has been made, since the introduction of
the proposed constitutional amendment of Senator John W.
Bricker in 1952,1 'to limit the capacity of the President to enter
into executive agreements binding upon the United States without the advice and consent of the Congress, save for a few legislative efforts requiring the President to transmit executive agreements, entered into on his allegedly independent or congressional authority, to the Congress. 1" Still, the powers constitutionally granted to the Congress, to enact legislation imposing
such limits and facilitating the exercise of the proper congressional role in the making of international agreements, "are not
lost by being allowed to lie dormant, any more than non-existent
4. Id.
5. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrrUTION 177 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as HENKIN].
6. Id. at 186. The assertion made is purely speculative, and qualified, in
a footnote to United States v. Capps, 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). See also M. McDougal and A. Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executive or PresidentialAgreements: Interchangeable Instruments
of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 304 (1945) [hereinafter cited as McDougal
and Lans].
7. See id.; BERGER, supra note 2,at 88-100.

8. U.S. CONT.art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

This section provides that the President

'[Slhall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,

to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.
9. S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). This resolution is commonly
referred to as the Bricker Amendment. See also S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1953); S.J. Res. 1, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); and compare Sutherland, Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1305 (1952), with Richberg, Bricker
Amendment and the Treaty Power, 39 VA. L. REV. 753 (1953).
10. See, e.g., S. 596, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) enacted as P.L. 92-403,
86 Stat. 619 (1972); S. 3475, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972).
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powers can be prescripted by an unchallenged exercise."" The
Congress, at least arguably, has the constitutional authority to
enact legislation restricting the capacity of the President to enter
into executive agreements without its advice and consent in several areas of national and international concern.
One such area is that of settlement of international claims
by nationals of the United States against foreign governments.
The claim settlement agreement is a vehicle employed by the federal government to pursue such claims; for example, such an
agreement would be an appropriate procedure to procure from a
foreign government reimbursement for property which it expropriated abroad from United States citizens. This article will direct itself to the proper constitutional power of Congress to
check the presidential use of the executive agreement in this
field.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF CONGRESS

The Constitution grants to the Congress the power
[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
12
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
While the power thus granted has but once been explicitly used
by the Congress, at least in recent years, to enact legislation
dealing with foreign relations of the United States,' 3 this residual reservoir of congressional power places in Congress the
power to legislate in all matters relating to the conduct of foreign relations by the national government.' 4 Indeed, as the
Supreme Court has stated:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
11. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647 (1950), cited in
BERGER, supra note 2, at 87.

12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
13. See War Powers Resolution, § 2(a), 83 Stat. 555 (1973); Neely v.
Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
14. See report entitled THE LEGAL BASIS UPON WHICH CONGRESS MAY HAVE
A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE TEXTS OF ALL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, in Hearings

before the Subcommittee on National Security and Scientific Developments of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on S. 596, H.R. 14365, and H.R. 14647,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
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consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional. 1

The grant of power contained in the Necessary and Proper Clause
thus permits the passage of legislation on any matter "within the
scope of the Constitution,"'1 6 including any matters arising out of
powers vested not only in the Congress, but also in "the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof,"' 7 so long as the means adopted by the Congress to regulate such matters is "legitimate"' and "consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution."' 9 Hence, the Congress may,
"should it be thought necessary . . . define and codify the powers of -the government as a whole, including ,those of the
President as its principal officer." 2
Even if the President is
thought to have independent authority to enter into executive
agreements settling outstanding claims of nationals of the United
States, as some would assert,2 ' the Congress would still, under
15. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 206 (1819).
16. Id.
17. U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 8.
18. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159, 206 (1819).
19. id.
20. S.REP. No. 92-606, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 15-16 (1972), cited in House
Hearings, supra note 14, at 25. See also Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
21. See statement by John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser, Department of
State in Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 596,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 73-75 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings],
maintaining that the President is possessed of authority to settle such international
claims pursuant to his power to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers", U.S. CoNsT. art. II,§ 3, a power which Professor Berger cites Alexander
Hamilton as "constrained to explain" as "more a matter of dignity than of authority" and "without consequence in the administration of government." BERGER, supra note 2, at 120, 153. Indeed, Professor Berger himself describes such assertions of presidential authority by suggesting:
So flimsy a base offers shaky support for a claim to oust Senate participation in the making of such settlement agreements, considering particularly the confiscatory impact of such settlements on the reimbursement
of claims of citizens.
Id. at 153.
The confiscatory impact of such settlements upon the claims of U.S. nationals
is readily apparent from recent practice before the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission. Indeed, of ten recent claims settlement programs supervised by that
commission pursuant to lump sum settlement agreements, the indemnification of
claimants averaged only 35.47% of the amount awarded such claimants by the
commission, and only 6.61 % of the total amount claimed. See FOREIGN CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES, DECISIONS AND ANNOTATIONS

at 11, 157, 158, 265, 297, 379, 457, 567 (1968). The problems of inadequate
compensation are further magnified by the effects of delay in settlement, which
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,the authority granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause, be
able to enact legislation regulating the exercise of that presidential power.2 2 However, Congress need not specifically regulate presidential authority and conduct in the making of such
agreements in order to accomplish that end. The Congress
may alternatively enact appropriate legislation, independent of
its regulation of presidential authority, to carry into execution
powers specifically granted to it by the Constitution.
The Congress is endowed by the Constitution with the power
to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian Tribes."23 Even as early as
1824, when the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of
Gibbons v. Ogden,2 4 it was recognized that ,the power thus
granted ,tothe Congress was
[L]ike all others vested in congress . . .complete in itself.
[It] may be exercised -to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than [those] prescribed in the constitution. . . . If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of congress, though limited to specified objects, is
plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, is vested in
congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the
exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the
25
United States.
Since that decision was promulgated by the Court, vast expansions of congressional power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce have occurred, even to the extent of permitting the
Congress to entirely prohibit foreign commerce in certain goods,
if it finds such prohibition necessary or proper.2 6
deprives claimants of their ability to put to productive use whatever compensation
they may ultimately receive during often lengthy negotiations, and the effects of
inflation. See also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1941).
22. See discussion of presidential powers in text accompanying notes 45-83,
infra.
23. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
25. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 86 (1824).
26. See Buttfield v, Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (drugs); Weber v.
Freed, 239 U.S. 325 (1914) (films of prizefighting); and Board of Trustees v.

United States, 289 U.S. 48, 57 (1933), which suggests that:
The Congress may determine what articles may be imported into this
country and the terms upon which importation is permitted. No one can
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27
In deciding the case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals suggested, while considering
the applicability and constitutionality of the Hickenlooper
Amendment,2" that "it is clear that there is ample constitutional
authority for an assertion of congressional power"2 9 over the
subject matter of the legislation, namely the taking of property
by a foreign state, as such a taking is considered "an act of a
foreign state in violation of the principles of international law."8
As well, ,there is authority for the submission of such issues to the
jurisdiction of federal courts for decisions on the merits."
Through the constitutional authority granted to Congress to regulate commerce, to make all laws which are necessary and
proper for the execution of powers vested in the Federal government, and to "define and punish. . . Offenses against the Law of
Nations," 3 the court concluded:
Since Congress thus clearly possesses a constitutional interest in the problem involved in this case, it was entitled
to make its will known by means of a statute. In Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, . . . the same objection
raised here, ,that a matter was within the President's exclusive
power over our foreign relations, was disposed of by the Supreme Court with the statement that: "The subject was one
in which Congress had an interest, and in respect to which it
could give directions by means of a legislative enactment. ' 33

be said to have a vested right to carry on foreign commerce with the
United States.
No case has been found, however, dealing with the power of Congress to prohibit
foreign commerce from emanating from the United States, which might plausibly
involve such "vested rights". Presumably such prohibition would be permissible
as well, as long as consistent with Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. Cf.
Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 301 (1849); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S.
321, 373-74 (1903); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). See also
Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964).
27. 383 F.2d 166, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 356, rehearing denied, 390 U.S.
1037 (1968).
28. The Hickenlooper Amendment. 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (1964), as amended,
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1970).
29. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 182, cert. denied, 390
U.S. 356, rehearingdenied, 390 U.S. 1037 (1968).
30. S. REP. No. 170, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 19 (1965).
31. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 182, cert. denied, 390
U.S. 356, rehearingdenied, 390 U.S. 1037 (1968).
32. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
33. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 182, cert. denied, 390
U.S. 356, rehearingdenied, 390 U.S. 1037 (1968) (citations omitted).
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Though the case did not directly deal with the authority of the

Congress to enact legislation concerning international claims, or
the power of the President to independently enter into agree-

ments for their settlement, it is clear that pursuant to the authority granted to the Congress by the Commerce Clause, the Congress may permissibly enact legislation relating to the settlement
of international claims.

Indeed, it has been suggested that

"[f]rom the beginning the foreign trade of the United States was
near the core of its foreign policy and the power to regulate com-

'3 4
merce with foreign nations gave Congress a major voice in it."

As is alluded to above, the Congress is likewise endowed by
the Constitution with the power to "define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations."3
While the authority thus
granted has not often -been used by the Congress,3 6 it has been
held that statutes enacted pursuant to the constitutional grant to
define such offenses are constitutional.3 7 Since conduct "attributable to a state and causing injury to an alien is wrongful . . .
34. HENKIN, supra note 5, at 69.
35. U.S. CONsr., art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1651, 62 Stat. 683, 774, provides:
Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy, as defined by
the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United
States, shall be imprisoned for life. (emphasis added).
See also 4 WHrrEMAN, supra note 3, at 648 et seq.; The Hickenlooper Amendment,
78 Stat. 1009, 1013, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1970).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 71 (1820); United
States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 198 (1844) (declaring the definition of piracy as an offense against the law of nations, an appropriate exercise
of congressional constitutional authority); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942),
in which the Supreme Court found that by sanctioning the jurisdiction of military
commissions to try individuals for violating the laws of war, Congress appropriately exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.
38. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, §§ 164-177 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT], especially § 165,
which provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Conduct attributable to a state and causing injury to an alien
is wrongful under international law if it
(a) departs from the international standard of justice, or
(b) constitutes a violation of an international agreement.
(2) The international standard of justice specified in Subsection
(1) is the standard required for the treatment of aliens by
(a) the applicable principles of international law as established by international custom, judicial and arbitral decisions, and other
recognized sources, or, in the absence of such applicable principles,
(b) analogous principles of justice generally recognized by
states that have reasonably developed legal systems. ...
See also, 8 WHITEMAN, supra note 3, at 697-706.
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under the law of nations if it violates the "international standard
of justice" 9 established for the treatment of aliens by states, the
Congress might, pursuant to its power to "define . . . Offenses
against the Law of Nations,"4 0 constitutionally define the conditions under which the United States will regard as wrongful the
conduct of a foreign state which is injurious, in some manner,
to a national of the United States. By enacting necessary and
proper legislation to define such conditions, the Congress might
also punish such wrongful conduct by describing the conditions
which a foreign state must meet in making reparations for such
wrongful conduct before the United States will regard such conduct as fully retributed, and before which the United States will
agree to a settlement of claims against foreign states arising out
of such wrongful conduct.
The Congress is possessed of other powers, including the
power to investigate the conduct of other branches of the government, 4 ' and the power to "dispose of . . .property belonging
39. Id. § 165(1)(a).
40. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
41. No specific constitutional provision is to be found granting either house
of Congress the power to make investigations and compel the production of documents of giving oral testimony. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized the power of the Congress to make such investigations, implying such
power from the general vesting of legislative power in the Congress. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957); ci. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). Such investigatory
powers as may vest in the Congress may be grounded upon legislation, at least
arguably, enacted pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause to facilitate other
congressional legislation, should Congress find such legislation necessary. It may
itself be relied upon by the Congress to compel the submission of international
executive agreements, pertaining to matters appropriately within the ambit of congressional concerns, by the President to the Congress. Indeed, such legislation
has recently been considered by the Congress. See Senate Hearings, supra note
21; House Hearings, supra note 14. However, all such investigatory claims must
confront opposing presidential claims to withhold such agreements grounded upon
"executive privilege" or "national security".
In the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974), the Court recognized that "executive privilege" to withhold certain
documents from the judiciary has some support in the Constitution:
Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers; the protection of the confidentiality of presidential communications
has similar constitutional underpinnings ...
However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need
for confidentiality of high level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. . . . Absent a claim of need to
protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets, we find
it very difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of presidential communications is significantly
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' pursuant to which it may enact necessary
to the United States,"42

and proper legislation concerning the settlement of claims by
nationals of the United States against foreign sovereigns.
Though the Necessary and Proper Clause provides the Con-

gress with a vast reservoir of power to enact legislation to carry
into effect its own enumerated powers, as well as those of "the

Government of the United States, or. .. any Department or Officer thereof,"43 the question still remains whether the Congress
may, by relying upon the Necessary and Proper Clause, or any
of its other enumerated powers, enact legislation restricting the
diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with
all the protection that a district court will be obliged to provide.
Id. at 705-706. The Court thus held that the President was required to produce
the famous "Watergate Tapes" for inspection by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.
While the decision in Nixon dealt with an assertion of "executive privilege"
by the President when confronted with a judicial subpoena duces tecum, and is
therefore not perfectly analogous, the decision is instructive about the existence
of the privilege and its likely successful assertion in the face of congressional action. Since settlement agreements may be transmitted to the Congress under an
injunction of secrecy, potentially the equivalent of in camera judicial inspection,
and since the Congress is vested with strong constitutional authority in the field
of foreign affairs (where courts are not so endowed), it may well be that the President could not justifiably advance even the few reasons enumerated by the court
in Nixon, to prevent the transmission of international executive claims settlement
agreements to the Congress. Indeed, the Congress has already enacted legislation
which would require the transmission of such agreements to it, under appropriate
injunctions of secrecy. See S.596, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), enacted as P.L.
92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (1972). See also BERGER, supra note 2; Hearings before the
Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
42. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The power of Congress to dispose of
any kind of property belonging to the United States "is vested in Congress without
limitation." Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1953), cited in 14 WHrrEMAN, supra note 3,at 249. The power of Congress to dispose of property belonging to
the United States is augmented by its power to appropriate funds and to pay debts.
U.S. CONsr., art. I, §§ 8, 9. At least arguably under international law, a claim
by a national if the United States against a foreign sovereign is not "owned" by
such national, but rather by the state of which he is a national, namely the United
States, though this is most often viewed as a question of standing rather than substance in the advancing of an international claim. See RESTATEMENT, supra note
38, §§ 174, 211, 213. The Congress might, however, enact necessary and proper
legislation defining such claims as the "property" of the United States, consistently
with both international and constitutional law, subjected thereby to the "ownership" of the United States. Hence, such claims thus "belonging" to the United
States, as intangible property, in the nature of a debt owed to the United States,
would be subject to the disposal of the Congress under "all needful rules and regulations," U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, which the Congress may deem fit to
provide through legislation.
43. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
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capacity of the President to enter into international agreements
relating to the settlement of international claims.

Each of these

powers of Congress provides a means by which it may enact legislation relating to the subject matter generally, but each in turn
must confront the conflicting claims of the President to enter into
international executive agreements upon, his own "inherent"
44
powers, without interference by the Congress.
II.

PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY:

POWERS AND LIMITATIONS

The presidential authority for entering into international executive agreements settling claims of nationals of the United

States against foreign governments must be found in his capacity
to recognize foreign governments, receive foreign ambassadors, in
his capacity as the nation's Chief Executive or, perhaps, as the
"sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations . . ."
To constitutional authority other than
that contained in these meager provisions, the President has not,
46
and probably cannot, make any claim.
The power of the President to receive foreign ambassadors
would not, by itself, seem to grant to the President any independent authority to enter into international executive agreements. Indeed, the power thus granted has been regarded as more a "func-

'tion rather than a 'power', a ceremony which in many countries
44. That Congress may authorize the settlement of specific claims or groups
of claims by the President through executive agreements, either pursuant to statute
or treaty, is nowhere doubted. See RESTATEMENT supra note 38, § 119, 120. It
may even condition the conclusion of such agreements on the happening of certain
contingencies. See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 872 (1962); 14
WHITEMAN supra note 3, at 223.
The important question here is whether Presidential claims to independent "inherent" powers will permit the President to negotiate international executive claims settlement agreements without prior congressional authorization or in contravention of the express wishes of Congress specified in such legislatively imposed conditions (one of which might plausibly be the
submission of such agreements to the Senate for its advice and consent pursuant
to constitutional provisions for the making of treaties). See W. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

363 (1941), suggesting that a "case can

be made for the President's constitutional authority to enter into and enforce any
bona fide international agreement that is not in conflict with the Constitution regardless of congressional approval or at least if Congress does not by law dissent." (emphasis added).
45. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); and discussion in note 21 supra. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 121.
46. This statement obviously ignores presidential claims of independent authority to withhold such agreements from the scrutiny of Congress based on "executive privilege". See note 39, supra.
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is performed by a figurehead."4 7 Yet in United States v. Belmont 48 the power granted to the President to receive ambassadors was expanded beyond its literal bounds to include the power
to enter into executive agreements settling international claims.
The Court, there speaking through Justice Sutherland, suggested
in dicta that the recognitior of the government of the Soviet
Union, "the establishment of diplomatic relations, the [Litvinov]
assignment, and agreements with respect thereto, were all parts
of one transaction, resulting in an international compact between the two governments." 49 Yet the Court felt compelled to
say more and added:
That the negotiations, acceptance of the assignment and
agreements and understandings in respect thereof were
within the competence of the President may not be doubted.
Governmental power over internal affairs is distributed between the national government and the several states. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but
is vested exclusively in the national government. And, in
respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that government. The assignment . . . did not, as in the case of treaties, as that
term is used in the treaty making clause of the Constitution [art. II, § 2], require the advice and consent of the
Senate. 50
Four years later, in United States v. Pink," -the Court, this time
speaking through Justice Douglas, again decided a case involving
the settlement of the claims of nationals of the United States
against the government of the Soviet Union through an executive
agreement. While continuing to recognize the settlement of such
claims and the recognition of the Soviet Union as part of a
single transaction, the Court found additional authority for the
conclusion of such agreements:
Recognition is not always absolute; it is sometimes conditional. . . . 'Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals . . . certainly is a modest implied power of the President who is the
"sole organ of the federal government in the field of inter47. HENKIN, supra note 5, at 41.

See also note 21, supra.

48. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
49. Id. at 330.

50. Id. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223 (1941).
51. Id.
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national relations."
United States v. Curtis Wright Corp.
...
Effectiveness in handling the delicate problems of
foreign relations requires no less. Unless such a power exists, the power of recognition might be thwarted or seriously diluted. No such obstacle can be placed in the way
of rehabilitation of relations between this country and another nation, unless the historic conception of the powers
and responsibilities of the President in the conduct of for'52
eign affairs. . . is to be drastically revised."

Hence, from the narrow grant of powers to the President to
receive foreign ambassadors, it was "modestly implied" that the
President has the power to enter into international executive
agreements concerning the settlement of international claims during the process of recognition of a foreign government, without
the express authorization of the Congress. That modest implication of power has since been relied upon, even though the statements made by the court in both Belmont and Pink were entirely
unncessary to the instant decision.5 3 The expansive view of presidential authority pursuant to his power to receive foreign ambassadors is thus unwarranted," even if narrowed to the restricted sphere of the settlement of international claims.5 5 Fur52. Id. at 229 (citations omitted).
53. Both Belmont and Pink raised the question of whether an executive
agreement settling international claims could prevail over contrary state law or
policy. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937); United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223 (1941). Both cases were thus decided on the distribution of power between the states and the national government, and not the distribution of authority between the President and the Congress. Indeed, the Court
in Belmont suggested that "complete power over international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states." United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,
331 (1937) (emphasis added). The court did not distinguish between the
branches or "political departments" of the national government. Id. at 328.
54. It is interesting to note, therefore, that it was the authority of the President, and not that of the Senate, that was the last to be added to the Treaty
Clause, and then only at the last moments of the Constitutional Convention. See
BERGER, supra note 2, at 127. Hence, it might well be asserted that such an expansive reading of presidential powers in foreign affairs, as a totality, is unwarranted since:
The framers hardly intended by the inconsequential function (of receiving ambassadors) to authorize the President to evade Senate consent to
treaties for which they so painstakingly provided, particularly treaties of
serious import.
See also Reveley, Constitutional Allocation of
BERGER, supra note 2, at 159-62.
the War Powers Between the President and Congress: 1787-1788, 15 VA. J.
INT'L L. 73, 133-38 (1975).
55. BERGER, supra note 2, at 153.
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thermore, neither Belmont nor Pink in any way precludes the

Congress from asserting whatever constitutional authority it may
possess to legislatively prescribe the conditions under which such
agreements may be entered into by the President,5" though both
hold that the executive agreement therein considered did not
require the advice and consent of the Senate. 57 Hence, if presi-

dential authority is sufficient to preclude the exercise of any
power by Congress over the making of international agreements
concerning the settlement of international claims, it must be

found in presidential powers other than those he may have pursuant to his power to receive foreign ambassadors.
It might plausibly be asserted that the authority conferred
upon the President by the constitutional provision vesting executive power in him58 is sufficient to effect such a preclusion of
the legislative role. 59 However, such a conception of the executive power would do violence "to the clear intention [of the framers of the Constitution] to create an executive of rigorously limited powers, and the history of the words 'Executive power' .' 60 In56. One of such conditions might well be the submission by the President
of such agreements to the Senate for its advice and consent. See 14 WHITEMAN,
supra note 3, at 234 et seq.
The last sentence of the cited portion of the decision in United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1941), and accompanying text, is curiously ambiguous on this
point. Nowhere is it specified by whom "such obstacles . . . placed in the way
of rehabilitating relations between this country and another nation", id. at 229,
might be placed, though presumably the phrase must refer to obstacles placed by
enactment of state rather than congressional legislation. Further, no differentiation is made, linguistically at least, between "obstacles" which may be removed
by the President (second sentence quoted) and other obstacles mentioned (last
sentence quoted). Finally, nowhere is a description of the "historic conception
of the powers of the President" provided, though presumably that conception of
him must be the one found in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936), and cited in the text. In the absence of a clear preclusion of congressional authority in the international executive claims settlement agreement making
process, it must be presumed to remain intact.
57. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
58. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 1. See also HENKIN, supra note 5, at 41-43.
59. See, e.g., McDougal and Lans, supra note 6, at 338, suggesting that the
President might "disregard" statutes enacted by Congress which relate to subjects
within the "President's special competence-related, for example, to the recognition of a foreign government or to an exercise of his authority as Commander
in Chief ..
" Id.
60. See BERGER, supra note 2, at 58-59, wherein he cites Meyers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting), in which it is stated that
"[t]he duty of the President to see that the laws be faithfully executed is a duty
that does not go beyond the laws." See also Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring), which states that "the
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deed, the executive power, being one specifically enumerated by
the framers, did not "convey in bulk all conceivable power."61
Rather, it required that the President faithfully execute laws necessarily and properly enacted by the Congress. Hence, the
granting of the executive power to the President was merely "an
allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated." 6 Since the conclusion of international agreements
other than treaties, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, is not included among such after enumerated powers, it
certainly cannot be asserted that the executive power precludes
the Congress from enacting legislation prescribing conditions for
the settlement of international claims.
So, we come finally upon the powers of the President as
"the sole organ of the federal government in the field of interna."6 These are commonly termed the Presitional relations ..
dent's foreign relations powers, and were first enunciated in the
landmark decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.6 4 It is this power upon which many other assertions of presidential authority are founded.6 5 The Curtiss-Wright
case was one in which the court was called upon to make a determination of the question
[W]hether the Joint Resolution [under consideration in the
case] as applied to that situation, is vulnerable to attack
under the rule that forbids a delegation of the lawmaking
power [by the Congress to the President]. In other words,
assuming (but not deciding) that the challenged delegation,
if it were confined to internal affairs, would be invalid, may
it nevertheless be sustained on the ground that its exclua remedy for a hurtful condition within
sive aim is to afford
66
foreign territory?
In short, the question presented by the case was whether the
Congress could properly delegate to the President legislative
power which it possessed in the field of foreign relations. While
power to execute the laws starts and ends with the law Congress has enacted."

Id.
61. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
62. Id.

63. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 315 U.S. 203 (1941); United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223 (1941).

66. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
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deciding that the delegation in question was not improper or unconstitutional because of the essentially different character of federal power in foreign relations,6 7 the Court added, in the course
of its general discussion of the foreign relations powers of the federal government:
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.
He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate;
but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the
Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it. As Marshall said in his great argument of March
7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, "The President is
the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its
sole representative with foreign nations . . .
While the Court then suggested that the authority thus granted
to the President did not depend upon a legislative enactment, it
failed to specify that the authority thus granted was only to
"make Treaties"6 9 and then with "the Advice and Consent of the
Senate." 70 Likewise, the Court failed to note that the power to
"speak or listen as a representative of the nation," 71 even as ",the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations,"7 2 did not
necessarily imply that the President had a power to bypass constitutional provisions relating to the making of treaties, or to
make international agreements binding the United States domestically, as well as internationally, through some inherent power
of which he was possessed. Indeed, the Court properly noted that
if such "inherent power" exists, "as necessary concommitants of
nationality," 73 it was "vested in the federal government ' 74 and not
in any individual branch thereof. Yet, from the President's power
as the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations,' 75 from his power to "speak or listen,' 76 vast assertions of presidential power in the field of international affairs
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 319.
id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
U.S. CONST., art. 11, sec. 2, cl. 1.
Id.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
Id.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 319.
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have been made,"' the only justification for which has been the
modification of the explicit language of the Constitution by "usage". 78 Such usage has long been regarded as an inadequate
source of constitutional authority when confronted with other,
more explicit constitutional provisions. 71 Indeed, the CurtissWright case itself, as Justice Jackson properly noted in Youngstown, "intimated that the President might act in external affairs without congressional authority, but not that he might act
contrary to an Act of Congress."8 0 Hence, the President's supposed
inherent powers as the "sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations"' certainly cannot preclude
congressional attempts at legislation concerning :the capacity of
the President to enter into international agreements settling the
claims of nationals of the United States against foreign sovereigns.
Nor, indeed, can such powers preclude any congressional legislation in the field of international relations.
The President may be seized of the power to make international agreements with or without the approval of Congress.
Yet, the Congress cannot be precluded from enacting legislation
conditioning the making of such agreements upon the happening of certain contingencies including, perhaps, the submission of
such agreements to the Senate for its advice and consent. The
question still remains, however, whether congressional legislation
requiring the President to submit international agreements settling the claims of United States nationals against foreign sovereigns to the Senate for its advice and consent may prevail over
presidential assertions of authority to refuse to comply with such
legislation.
77. See generally, McDougal and Lans, supra note 6; Moore, Executive
Agreements and Congressional-ExecutiveRelations in Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
S. 3475, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 149-60 (1972). See also 39 Opp. Arr'Y GEN'L
484 (1940).

78. See McDougal and Lans, supra note 6, at 304 et seq.; Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
79. See BERGER, supra note 2, at 90, 98 passim, in which Lord Denman is
quoted as saying: "The practice of a ruling power in the state is but a feeble
proof of its legality," and Justice Frankfurter is quoted as suggesting that: "Deeply
implanted traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply them."

80. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 n.2
(1952).

81. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
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III. ENABLING CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
In 1952, the Supreme Court heard and decided what became known as the "Steel Seizure" case, Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 2 This case presented a novel question regarding the constitutionality of the seizure of the nation's steel
mills pursuant to an executive order of President Harry S. Truman. The seizures were made without prior congressional authorization,"3 and hence the President was forced to rely upon
power granted to him which could be "implied from the aggregate
of his powers under the Constitution." 4 These included his
powers as Commander-in-Chief, Chief Executive, and that implied from the constitutional provision requiring him to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."8 5 Finding all legislative power in the Congress, the Court suggested that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes
the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." 8 6 The fact of presidential
precedents does not deprive the Congress of its
[E]xclusive constitutional authority 'to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution "in the Government of the United States, or any
Department or Officer thereof."8' 7
The Court held the seizure of the steel mills in question to be unconstitutional.88
While the case did not involve the specific
question considered here, and while it is perhaps distinguishable
from the instant case since it involved domestic rather than international affairs, the case was instructive as to the preclusion
of the President from actions binding domestically upon the
United States in the absence of congressional authorization. It
was also instructive as to the prevalence of specific constitutional
authority over implied powers whel the two confront one another. Most apposite to the instant case is the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson, in which he stated:
82. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
83. As stated by the Supreme Court:
There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as he did here. Nor is there any act of Congress
to which our attention has been directed from which such power can be
fairly implied. Indeed, we do not understand the Government to rely
on statutory authorization for this seizure.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-86 n.2 (1952).
-

84. Id. at 587.
85. Id.

86. Id.
87.

Id. at 588-89 (emphasis added).

88. Id. at 589.
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While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction
with those of Congress ...
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own
right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circircumstances, and in these only, may he be said . . . to personify the federal sovereignty....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely
upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.
In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on
the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is
at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive
presidential control in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim
to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be
scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. .. s
The implications of this discourse are clear. The presidential
capacity to enter into executive agreements in most, if not all,
cases based upon the President's independent powers, is held only
as a concurrent power, with Congress constitutionally able to act
legislatively on the subject matter of such agreements. Certainly,
in the instant case, presidential authority to enter into executive
agreements settling the claims of United States' nationals against
foreign governments is held concurrently with the powers of Con89.

Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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gress to regulate commerce with foreign nations,9 ° to define and
punish offenses against the law of, nations, 9 ' and to make all
laws necessary and proper for the execution of the functions of
government. 92 In such cases, therefore, the powers of both the
President and the Congress are in a "zone of twilight"9 3 in which
there is no clear definition of the prevalence of one over the other.
In such cases, it may only be said that in the absence of congressional legislation, the President may act upon his own "independent presidential responsibility,"9 the constitutionality of
which must depend upon "the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables." 9 5 Indeed 'this uncertain situation
would seem 'to exist at present whenever the President enters into
international claims agreements without prior congressional authorization.

The enactment of specific legislation, or the approval of certain treaties has, until now, been the means of resolving such uncertainties about presidential power to enter into international
agreements settling the claims of nationals of the United States
against foreign governments.96 Yet the situation has arisen with
increasing frequency in which 'the President does not seek such
prior congressional approval. It is conceiveable that -the situation may arise in which the President enters into specific claims
settlement agreements not entirely in accord with the express or
implied wishes of the Congress.97
The enactment of legislation by the Congress, therefore, concerning the entrance by the President into executive agreements
settling the claims of nationals; of the United States against a foreign government will have the dual effect of removing whatever
uncertainty about the distribution of powers between the President and the Congress that may now exist, and of adding to the
90.
91.
92.
93.

See notes 23-34, supra, and accompanying text.
See notes 35-39, supra, and accompanying text.
See Section I, supra.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38

(1952).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See 14 WHITEMAN, supra note 3, at 247, describing the practice of the
Department of State "to obtain the approval of the Senate for the settlement of
international claims." See also, RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, at 119-21, 131,
141-144.
97. See note 42, supra.
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power of the President "all that Congress can delegate."9 8 Presidential power, in such a situation "is at its maximum.." 99 Hence,
legislation which would require the President to submit such
agreements to the Senate for its advice and consent would add
to, rather than detract from, the power of the President to negotiate such agreements. 100
To suggest that the Congress may not enact such legislation
would force the President to rely on "his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter." '' In this case, congressional powers are substantial. Such
a claim of presidential authority "must be scrutinized with caution," 10 2 for in effect it "disabl[es] the Congress from acting upon
the subject." 0 3 Likewise, if the President chooses to enter into

such executive agreements in contravention of the prior expressed
wish of the Congress, as by refusing to submit such agreements

to the Senate for its advice and consent when so required ' by
04

statute, the power of the President must be "at its lowest ebb."'
In any event, the enactment of legislation by the Congress
requiring the President to submit international agreements settling the claims of nationals of the United States against foreign
sovereigns, in accordance with constitutionally specified procedures, will remove the entire subject from the 'zone of twilight"' 5
within which it is now condemned to reside. An example of legislation which would accomplish these goals, and remain within
the enumerated provisions is set forth in the Appendix.
98. Indeed, it was the fear of many that the recently enacted "War Powers
Resolution" would constitute such a prior delegation of authority by the Congress
to the President. See, e.g., War Powers Legislation, 1973, Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
99. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38
(1952).
100. As a practical matter, if recognition is usually the end sought in the settlement of international claims, see note 19, supra, and if such recognition is desired by both parties to such recognition negotiations, the foreknowledge that such
claims settlement agreements must face the advice and consent of the Senate may
make it easier to settle the outstanding claims of nationals of the United States
against such government on terms favorable to such claimants. See note 21, supra.
101. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38
(1952).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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The Supreme Court has not yet been presented with a situation in which an executive agreement entered into on the sole
authority of the President is claimed to supervene a prior congressional statute which has an international effect. However, in
United States v. Capps,1 1 6 the court was given an opportunity to
rule on the domestic effect of such an allegedly supervening executive agreement. In that case, the question was whether an
executive agreement with Canada concerning the importation of
potatoes was invalid because it conflicted with a prior statute enacted by the Congress under its power over commerce with foreign nations. 1 7 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
it was invalid, stating that:
[T]he executive agreement was void because it was not authorized by Congress and contravened provisions of a statute dealing with the very matter to which it related and that
the contract [in dispute in the case] relied on, which was
in
based on the executive agreement, was unenforceable
08
the courts of the United States for like reason.'
Though some would suggest that the decision thus rendered takes
"the narrowest view of the President's power,"' 1 9 and that -the
decision by the Supreme Court to affirm on other grounds neutralized the views of the Fourth Circuit on executive agreements,"10
it seems clear that the Capps case must, in the absence of a contrary ruling by the Supreme Court, still stand for the proposition
that a prior congressional enactment must prevail over presidential assertions of independent authority to bind the United States,
as a matter of domestic law, through an executive agreement
entered into upon his own independent powers.
Hence, it might well be suggested that under the Capps case,
if the Congress enacted a statute requiring the President to sub106. 204 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1953), af 'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296

(1955).
107. The case, of course, was restricted to a consideration of its domestic invalidity. The international invalidity or validity of such an agreement entered
into in conflict with a prior Congressional statute remains in question. Cf. RESTATEMENT,

supra note 38, § 131.

108. United States v. Capps, 204 F.2d 658 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 144,
which specifies that "An executive agreement made by the United States without
reference to a treaty or an act of Congress . . . does not supercede inconsistent
provisions of earlier acts of Congress." Cf. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
99 (1804).

109. See HENKIN, supra note 5, at 181.
110. Id. at 186. See also note 50, supra.
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mit to the Senate for its advice and consent any international
agreement relating -to the settlement of international claims, such
a statute would prevail domestically over any assertion of independent presidential authority to the contrary. No such agreement, therefore, could become effective domestically, though it
might become effective internationally, unless and until it was
submitted to the Senate in compliance with both statutory and
constitutional provisions. In sum, then, not only is the President
unable to preclude the Congress from enacting legislation of the
type described above, but such legislation must prevail as a matter of domestic law, over any executive agreement to the contrary.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, authority can be found for assertions of both
presidential and congressional power over the making of international agreements relating to the settlement of international
claims. Neither the President nor the Congress can, in all likelihood, practically exclude the other entirely from acting on such
agreements in fields over which it possesses peculiar competence.
Yet, in an 'ultimate contest between such conflicting assertions of
power, it would be preferable, if not likely, for the legislative
branch to prevail.
The words of Justice Jackson should again be remembered,
however:
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon
its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy
but reciprocity.'1 1
Indeed, the Constitution is woven out of the gossamer fibers
upon which the fragile fabric of trust is based. Such fibers, it
should be noted, may easily be stretched or torn beyond the ability of time to repair them. If any injunction of action is to be
derived from this discussion it is merely that such internecine
conflicts between the claims of the two political departments of
our government should, if possible, be avoided, and that the letter and spirit of cooperation commanded by the Constitution
should be followed.
111. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38
(1952).
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APPENDIX
THE INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1975

A BILL
To help preserve the separation of powers and to further the
Constitutional prerogatives of the Congress by providing for the transmittal to and review by Congress of certain international agreements
other than treaties.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, that
whereas the Constitution of the United States provides for a system of shared powers between the Legislative and Executive branches
of the United States in the making of international agreements; and
whereas the Congress finds that its powers in the making of international agreements have been substantially eroded by the use of
so called international executive agreements; and
whereas the Senate of the United States has thereby been prevented from performing its assigned duties under Article II, section 2
of the Constitution of the United States which provides that the President of the 'United States "shall have power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of
the Senators present concur;" and
whereas under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution of the
United States, the Congress of the United States is granted the power
to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution not
only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof;
and
whereas under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution of the
United States, the Congress of the United States is vested with the
power to define and punish offenses against the Law of Nations; and
whereas the Congress finds that a state is responsible, under the
Law of Nations, for injury caused to an alien by conduct subject to its
jurisdiction that is attributable to the state, since such conduct departs from the standards established by international custom or otherwise recognized by international law, or since such conduct constitutes violation of the provisions of an international agreement to
which the United States is a party; and
whereas the Congress finds that the failure of a foreign state to
make reparation, in prompt, adequate and effective form, to a national of the United States for injury caused to such United States
national and attributable to the foreign state is an offense against
the Law of Nations; and
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whereas Congress finds it necessary and proper to the execution of its power to define Offenses against the Law of Nations and to
preserve its Constitutional prerogatives in the making of international agreements, to define the circumstances in which international
claims arising from an injury, caused by conduct subject to the jurisdiction of and attributable to a foreign state, to a national of the
United States, may be settled or waived by the government of the
United States; and
whereas the settlement of such international claims has a direct affect upon Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, which power to regulate is vested in the Congress of
the United States by Article I, section 8 of the Constitution of the
United States; and
whereas the definition of the circumstances in which such international claims may be settled or waived will necessarily and properly facilitate the regulation by Congress of Commerce with foreign
Nations and among the several States; therefore be it enacted as
follows:
Section 1. This act shall be known as the International Claims
Settlement Act of 1975.
Section 2. 'In furtherance of the provisions of the Constitution
of the United States regarding the sharing of powers in the making
of international executive agreements between the Executive and
Legislative 'Branches of the government of the United States, any international executive agreement relating to the settlement or waiver
of any international claim or claims by nationals of the United
States against any foreign government, made on or after the date of
enactment of this Act shall be transmitted to the Secretary of State,
who shall then transmit such agreement to the Congress.
However, any such agreement the immediate disclosure of which
would, in the opinion of the 'President, be prejudicial to the security of the United States shall instead be transmitted by the Secretary to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 'Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate written injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due
notice from the President. Each committee shall personally notify the
Members of its 'House that the Secretary has transmitted such an
agreement with an injunction of secrecy, and such agreement shall
'thereafter 'be available for inspection only 'by such Members.
Section 3. In -the case of any international executive agreement
relating to the settlement of any international claim or claims by nationals of the United States against any foreign government, where the
aggregate value of such claim or claims made by nationals of the
'United States against such foreign government exceeds $100,000,
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol5/iss2/3
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where 'the value of such claim or claims are determined in good faith
by the nationals of the United States concerned, or are determined by
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and where such claim or
claims arise out of a single transaction or occurrence or a series of related transactions or occurrences, such international executive agreement as is concluded in settlement or waiver of such claim or claims
shall come into force with respect to the United States only by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur.
Section 4. (a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 3 of this
Act, any international executive agreement concluded in settlement or
waiver of any international claim or claims by nationals of the United
States against any foreign government shall come into force with respect to the United States at the end of the first period of sixty calendar days of continuous session of Congress after -the date on which
the executive agreement is transmitted to Congress unless, between
the date of transmittal and the end of the sixty-day period, both
Houses pass a concurrent resolution stating in substance that both
Houses do not approve the executive agreement.
(b) 'For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section(1) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment
of Congress sine die; and
(2) the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a
day certain are excluded in the computation of the sixtyday period.
(c) Under provisions contained in an international executive
agreement, the agreement may come into force at a time later than the
date on which the agreement comes into force under subsections (a)
and (b) of this section.
Section 5. (a) For the purposes of this Act, the term "international executive agreement" means any bilateral or multilateral international agreement or commitment, other than a treaty, which is binding upon the United States, and which is made by the President of the
United States or any officer, employee, or representative of the Executive Branch of the government of the United States, whether such agreement or commitment is made pursuant to prior statutory authorization
of Congress, pursuant to a treaty to which the United is a party, or
pursuant to an assertion of independent authority by the President of
the 'United States.
(b) For the purposes of this Act "concurrent resolution" means
only a concurrent resolution of either House of Congress, the matter
after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That the Congress
does not approve the executive agreement numbered
transPublished by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1975
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mitted to (Congress) (the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 'Representatives) by the President on
., 19-.",
the blank
spaces therein being appropriately filled, and the appropriate words
within one of the parenthetical phrases being used; but does not include a concurrent resolution which specifies more than one executive
agreement.
Section 6. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the
Act or the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol5/iss2/3

26

